

Real-time Policy Enforcement with Metric First-Order Temporal Logic

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
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
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
Runtime enforcement




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
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
Goal:

Ensure compliance of
the system's behavior
with the policy

Runtime enforcement



Runtime enforcement



Metric First-Order Temporal Logic (MFOTL)

- First introduced by Chomicki [1]
- Expressive formalism for specifying **trace properties**

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$$\square [\forall x,y. (\blacklozenge_{[0,1000]} A(x,y)) \Rightarrow B(y)]$$

Runtime enforcement with MFOTL

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 - LTL (Acacia [4]...)
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 - Security automata (GREP [6], TiPEX [7]...)

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1. **Characterization** of enforceable MFOTL policies

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2. Enforcement **algorithm** for an expressive fragment
3. First MFOTL enforcement **tool**


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Characterizing enforceable MFOTL policies


An algorithm for MFOTL enforcement


An MFOTL enforcement tool: EnfPoly

Runtime enforcement setup

Signature	$\Sigma = (\mathbb{D}, \mathbb{E}, \alpha)$	domain \mathbb{D} , event names \mathbb{E} , arities $\alpha : \mathbb{E} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$
Events	$e(d_1, \dots, d_{\alpha(e)}) \in \text{Ev}$	$e \in \mathbb{E}, d_i \in \mathbb{D}$
Databases	$D = \{e_1, \dots, e_k\} \in \mathbb{DB}$	$e_i \in \text{Ev}$
Traces	$\sigma = (\tau_i, D_i)_{1 \leq i \leq k} \in \mathbb{T}$	$\tau_1 \leq \tau_2 \leq \dots \dots \leq \tau_i \in \mathbb{N}$  $D_i \in \mathbb{DB}$

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
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


We distinguish:

- *suppressable* (Sup) vs. *causable* (Cau) events [8]
- *controllable* (Sup \cup Cau) vs. *only-observable* (Obs) events [9]

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- *suppressable* (Sup) vs. *causable* (Cau) events [8]
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Additional assumption: $\text{Sup} \cap \text{Cau} = \emptyset$

Metric First-Order Temporal Logic

Syntax

MFOTL is defined by the grammar

$$\begin{aligned} \varphi ::= & r(t_1, \dots, t_{a(r)}) \mid \neg\varphi \mid \varphi \vee \varphi \mid \exists x. \varphi \\ & \mid \underbrace{\bullet_I}_{\text{"previous"}} \varphi \mid \underbrace{\circ_I}_{\text{"next"}} \varphi \mid \varphi \underbrace{S_I}_{\text{"since"}} \varphi \mid \varphi \underbrace{U_I}_{\text{"until"}} \varphi \end{aligned}$$

with $r \in \mathbb{E}$, V variables, $t_i \in V \cup \mathbb{D}$, $I \subseteq \{[a, b] \mid (a, b) \in \mathbb{N}^2, b > a\}$.

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The trace property specified by φ is $\mathcal{L}(\varphi) := \{\sigma \mid \emptyset, 1 \models_{\sigma} \varphi\}$

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Standard monitoring setup

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MFOTL for enforcement

Standard monitoring setup

Consider only (safety) policies of the form $\Box \varphi$

+ for practical enforcement

φ *future-free* (\approx independent of the future)

$\text{MFOTL}_{\Box}^{\mathcal{F}} := \{\Box \varphi \mid \varphi \text{ future free}\}$

Enforceability

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Example

Assume $B \in \text{Cau}$.

The policy $\square[\forall x, y. \blacklozenge_{[0,1000]} A(x, y) \Rightarrow B(y)]$ is enforceable.

MFOTL: negative result

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Is there an algorithm to decide if an MFOTL $_{\square}^{\mathcal{F}}$ policy is enforceable?

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Theorem 1

Assume that Sup contains an event of arity > 1 and $\text{Obs} \neq \emptyset$.
The set $\{\varphi \in \text{MFOTL}_{\square}^{\mathcal{F}} \mid \varphi \text{ is enforceable}\}$ is not computable.

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Proof: Reduction to the Entscheidungsproblem of FOL.

MFOTL: positive result

Define *guarded MFOTL* (GMFOTL) as

$$\psi ::= \perp \mid s(t_1, \dots, t_n) \mid \neg c(t_1, \dots, t_n) \mid \psi \wedge \varphi \mid \psi \vee \psi \mid \exists x. \psi$$

where $s \in \text{Sup}$, $c \in \text{Cau}$, and $\varphi \in \text{MFOTL}$.

Lemma

For all $\psi \in \text{GMFOTL}$, $\Box \neg \psi$ is enforceable.

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$$\Box[\forall x, y. \blacklozenge_{[0,1000]} A(x, y) \Rightarrow B(y)] \equiv \Box[\underbrace{\neg(\exists x, y. \neg B(y) \wedge \blacklozenge_{[0,1000]} A(x, y))}_{\in \text{GMFOTL}}]$$

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
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- \rightsquigarrow call $\mathcal{M}(\exists y. \neg B(y) \wedge \blacklozenge_{[0,1000]} A(x, y); \sigma, i) \rightsquigarrow$ output = $\{(1)\}$
- \rightsquigarrow falsify $\exists y. \neg B(y) \wedge \blacklozenge_{[0,1000]} A(x, y)$ on σ for $x = 1$
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- \rightsquigarrow falsify $\neg B(y) \wedge \blacklozenge_{[0,1000]} A(x, y)$ on σ for $x = 1, y = 2$
- \rightsquigarrow make $\neg B(y)$ false on σ for $x = 1, y = 2$

Enforcing MFOTL policies

Example

Consider $\varphi = \Box \neg\psi$ where $\psi = \exists x, y. \neg B(y) \wedge \blacklozenge_{[0,1000]} A(x, y)$.

Enforce φ on $\sigma = (0, \{A(1, 2), B(12)\})$.

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- \rightsquigarrow cause $B(y) = B(2)$

Enforcement algorithm

- In general, one top-down iteration is not sufficient (e.g., for $\psi = \neg B(1) \vee (\neg B(2) \wedge B(1))$)

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- Perform a fixpoint computation
- We prove termination for monitorable and enforceable policies

About the condition $\text{Sup} \cap \text{Cau} = \emptyset$

- Needed for our enforceability condition to hold

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- Needed for our algorithm to terminate
- Slightly relaxed in the implementation

Table of contents

Characterizing enforceable MFOTL policies

An algorithm for MFOTL enforcement

An MFOTL enforcement tool: EnfPoly

Implementation

- Extension of Basin et al.'s MonPoly [2]
- Ca. 500 loc OCaml code
- Runtime performance equivalent or better than GREP's [6] on LTL fragment
- Overhead < 50% with respect to MonPoly

<https://gitlab.ethz.ch/fhuble/mfotl-enforcement>

Conclusion

In this talk, we have seen:

- A **characterization** of enforceable MFOTL policies
- An **algorithm** for enforcing MFOTL policies
- The first enforcement **tool** for MFOTL

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In this talk, we have seen:

- A **characterization** of enforceable MFOTL policies
- An **algorithm** for enforcing MFOTL policies
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Open questions:

- Can we obtain a characterization for the case $\text{Sup} \cap \text{Cau}$?
- If such a characterization does not exist, how can we still extend the supported fragment?

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- Use \mathcal{M} as a subroutine
- Compute corrections following the structure top-down

Example

i	\top
τ_i	1663759108
D_i	A(1,2), B(12)
$\emptyset, i \models_{\sigma} \varphi$	X
$\neg \varphi = \exists c. \psi_1$	$v_1 = [()]$
$\psi_1 = \exists d. \psi_2$	$v_{11} = [(1)]$
$\psi_2 = \neg B(d) \wedge \psi_3$	$v_{21} = [(1, 2)]$
$\psi_3 = \top S_{[0, \infty)} A(c, d)$	$v_{31} = [(1, 2)]$
$B(d)$	$v_{41} = [(12)]$
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$$\text{enf}(\neg \varphi, \sigma, ()) = \text{enf}(\psi_1, \sigma, (1))$$

Enforcing MFOTL policies

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Performance




Fig. 3: Policies used to compare EnfPoly to GREP

