Proactive Real-Time First-Order Enforcement

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First-Order Runtime Enforcement



Real-Time First-Order Runtime Enforcement



Proactive Real-Time First-Order Runtime Enforcement



6<u>1</u>0

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Similarly for other data protection requirements, kernels, firewalls...

- ▶ Runtime enforcement: 'Enforceable security policies' [Schneider, 2000]
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- ► Few tools for enforcement of first-order temporal logic
 - BeepBeep [Hallé and Villemaire, 2009]: (future) LTL-FO, suppression only
 - ► ENFPOLY [Hublet et al., 2022]: Restricted fragment, mostly past-only
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- Monitoring of first-order temporal logic: МомРоцу, Verimon, DejaVu, WнуМом...

Contributions

First algorithm & tool for Proactive Real-Time First-Order Enforcement

Policy language: Metric First-Order Temporal Logic (MFOTL)

- 1. New system model for real-time proactive enforcement of first-order policies
- 2. EMFOTL, an expressive enforceable fragment of MFOTL
- 3. Enforcement algorithm for EMFOTL
- 4. WHYENF enforcement tool

Metric First-Order Temporal Logic (MFOTL)

Let $x \in V$ be a variable, $c \in C$ be a constant, $e \in E$ be an event and $I \in N \times N$ be an interval, Syntax

$$\begin{array}{ll} \mathbf{t} & ::= & \mathbf{x} \mid \mathbf{c} \\ \varphi & ::= & \mathbf{e}(\mathbf{t}_1, \dots, \mathbf{t}_n) \mid \top \mid \perp \mid \neg \varphi \mid \varphi \land \varphi \mid \varphi \lor \varphi \mid \\ & \varphi \rightarrow \varphi \mid \exists \mathbf{x}. \varphi \mid \forall \mathbf{x}. \varphi \mid \bullet_{\mathbf{I}} \varphi \mid \bigcirc_{\mathbf{I}} \varphi \mid \diamond_{\mathbf{I}} \varphi \mid \diamond_{\mathbf{I}} \varphi \\ & \bullet_{\mathbf{I}} \varphi \mid \Box_{\mathbf{I}} \varphi \mid \varphi \mathcal{S}_{\mathbf{I}} \varphi \mid \varphi \mathcal{U}_{\mathbf{I}} \varphi \end{array}$$

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Semantics (for a fixed trace $\langle (\tau_0, D_0), (\tau_1, D_1), \ldots \rangle$ and valuation $v : \mathbb{V} \mapsto \mathbb{D}$)

 $v,i \models \Diamond_{[a,b]} \varphi \iff v,j \models \varphi \text{ for some } j \ge i \text{ with } \tau_j - \tau_i \in [a,b]$



MFOTL: Example

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Policy (informal, 'undue delay' ~ > 30 days)

WHENEVER: user **u** requests the deletion of data **d** ENSURE: **d** is deleted within 30 days

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Policy (MFOTL)

 $\Box (\forall d, u. \text{ deletion_request } (u, d) \rightarrow \Diamond_{[0,30]} \text{delete } (d))$

EMFOTL: an enforceable MFOTL fragment

- Restriction: require that every event kind is only caused or only suppressed [Hublet et al., 2022]
 + Avoids degenerate cases such as e A ¬e with e both causable and suppressable
- $\phi \in \text{EMFOTL iff there exists } \Gamma \text{ such that } \Gamma \vdash \phi : \mathbb{C}$ + The typing context Γ is a mapping: $\mathbb{E} \to \{\mathbb{C}, \mathbb{S}\}$
- (Selected) rules

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \phi : \mathbb{S}}{\Gamma \vdash \phi \to \psi : \mathbb{C}} \to^{\mathbb{C}L} \qquad \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash \psi : \mathbb{C}}{\Gamma \vdash \phi \to \psi : \mathbb{C}} \to^{\mathbb{C}R}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \phi : \mathbb{C} \quad \sup I < \infty}{\Gamma \vdash \phi_I \phi : \mathbb{C}} \diamond^{\mathbb{C}} \qquad \qquad \frac{\vdash \phi : \mathsf{PG}(x)^- \quad \Gamma \vdash \phi : \mathbb{C}}{\Gamma \vdash \forall x. \phi : \mathbb{C}} \forall^{\mathbb{C}}$$

If delete is causable, then $\forall d, u. \text{ deletion_request } (u, d) \rightarrow \Diamond_{[0,30]} \text{delete } (d) \in \text{EMFOTL}$

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 $\{ \text{delete} \mapsto \mathbb{C} \} \vdash \forall d, u. \text{ deletion_request} (d) \rightarrow \Diamond_{[0,30]} \text{delete} (d) : \mathbb{C}$

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- $\begin{array}{c|c} \underline{\Xi_1} & \overline{\{\text{delete} \mapsto \mathbb{C}\} \vdash \forall u. \, \text{deletion_request} \, (u,d) \rightarrow \Diamond_{[0,30]} \text{delete} \, (d) : \mathbb{C}} \\ \hline \\ \hline \{\text{delete} \mapsto \mathbb{C}\} \vdash \forall d, u. \, \text{deletion_request} \, (d) \rightarrow \Diamond_{[0,30]} \text{delete} \, (d) : \mathbb{C}} \end{array} \\ \forall^{\mathbb{C}} \end{array}$
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 $\begin{array}{c|c} \displaystyle \Xi_2 & \overline{\{\text{delete} \mapsto \mathbb{C}\} \vdash \text{deletion_request} (u,d) \to \Diamond_{[0,30]} \text{delete} (d) : \mathbb{C}} \\ \displaystyle \Xi_1 & \overline{\{\text{delete} \mapsto \mathbb{C}\} \vdash \forall u. \, \text{deletion_request} (u,d) \to \Diamond_{[0,30]} \text{delete} (d) : \mathbb{C}} \\ \hline & \forall^{\mathbb{C}} \\ \hline & \{\text{delete} \mapsto \mathbb{C}\} \vdash \forall d, u. \, \text{deletion_request} (d) \to \Diamond_{[0,30]} \text{delete} (d) : \mathbb{C}} \end{array} \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \forall^{\mathbb{C}} \\ \forall^{\mathbb{C}} \end{array}$

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$$\begin{array}{c} \displaystyle \frac{\text{delete} \in \mathbb{C}}{\frac{\{\text{delete} \mapsto \mathbb{C}\} \vdash \text{delete}(\text{d}) : \mathbb{C} \quad \mathbb{B}^{\mathbb{C}} \quad 30 < \infty}{\{\text{delete} \mapsto \mathbb{C}\} \vdash \text{delete}(\text{d}) : \mathbb{C}} \quad \diamond^{\mathbb{C}} \\ \\ \displaystyle \frac{\Xi_{2} \quad \overline{\{\text{delete} \mapsto \mathbb{C}\} \vdash \text{deletion_request}(\text{u}, \text{d}) \rightarrow \diamond_{[0,30]} \text{delete}(\text{d}) : \mathbb{C}}}{\{\text{delete} \mapsto \mathbb{C}\} \vdash \forall \text{u. deletion_request}(\text{u}, \text{d}) \rightarrow \diamond_{[0,30]} \text{delete}(\text{d}) : \mathbb{C}}} \quad \overset{\rightarrow^{\mathbb{C}R}}{\forall^{\mathbb{C}}} \\ \\ \hline \{\text{delete} \mapsto \mathbb{C}\} \vdash \forall \text{d. u. deletion_request}(\text{d}) \rightarrow \diamond_{[0,30]} \text{delete}(\text{d}) : \mathbb{C}}} \quad \overset{\rightarrow^{\mathbb{C}R}}{\forall^{\mathbb{C}}} \end{array}$$

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Enforcement algorithm

In every step i with timestamp τ :

- \blacktriangleright The algorithm starts with a goal Φ
 - + If i = 0, this goal is just the target policy
- By decomposing the goal into simpler goals, it computes:
 - + C $\subseteq \mathbb{C} \times \mathbb{D}^*$: events to cause
 - + S \subseteq S × D^{*}: events to suppress
 - + X': new set of obligations for the next time-point



Enforcement algorithm: Correctness

An enforcer \mathcal{E} is *sound* with respect to a formula φ iff for any trace σ , we have $\models_{\mathcal{E}(\sigma)} \varphi$. It is *transparent* with respect to φ iff for all σ with $\models_{\sigma} \varphi$, then $\mathcal{E}(\sigma) = \sigma$.

Theorem: Soundness

If $\varphi \in \text{EMFOTL}$, the enforcer \mathcal{E}_{φ} is sound.

Theorem: Transparency

If $\varphi \in \text{TEMFOTL}^*$, the enforcer \mathcal{E}_{φ} is transparent.

* see definition in the extended version of our paper



where $WHYMON^*$ is a modified version of WHYMON [Lima et al., TACAS 2024] which

- returns Boolean verdicts instead of explanations
- includes a function SAT that checks if a valuation satisfies a formula on a trace prefix given some future obligations

Evaluation

Dataset:

- ▶ MFOTL formalization of core GDPR provisions [Arfelt et al.., 2019]
- ▶ Traces produced by a real-world system [Debois et al., 2015] with ~4,000 time-points
- ▶ Random synthetic traces with length 100-25600 and time-point sizes 1–256

Research questions:

- RQ1. Is EMFOTL expressive enough to formalize real-world policies? Is manual formula rewriting necessary?
- RQ2. At what maximum event rate can WHYENF perform real-time enforcement?
- RQ3. Do WHYENF's performance improve upon the state-of-the-art?

Evaluation – RQ1 (Expressiveness)

Minimization: $\Box(\forall c, d, u. collect(c, d, u) \rightarrow \Diamond use(c, d, u))$

Limitation: $\Box(\forall c, d, u. collect(c, d, u) \rightarrow \diamond_{[0,b]} delete(c, d, u))$ Lawfulness: $\Box(\forall c, d, u. use(c, d, u) \rightarrow \blacklozenge(consent(u, c) \lor legal_grounds(u, d)))$ Consent: $\Box(\forall c, d, u. use(c, d, u) \rightarrow (\blacklozenge legal_grounds(u, d)) \lor (\neg revoke(u, c) S consent(u, c)))$ Information: $\Box(\forall c, d, u. collect(c, d, u) \rightarrow ((\bigcirc inform(u)) \lor (\blacklozenge inform(u))))$

Deletion: $\Box(\forall c, d, u. \text{ deletion_request}(c, d, u) \rightarrow \Diamond_{[0,30]} \text{delete}(c, d, u))$

 $\textbf{Sharing:} \qquad \Box(\forall c, d, u, p. \, \textsf{deletion_request}(c, d, u) \land (\blacklozenge \textsf{share}(p, d)) \rightarrow \Diamond_{[0,30]} \textsf{notify}(p, d))$

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Evaluation – RQ1 (Expressiveness)

X Minimization: $\Box(\forall c, d, u. collect(c, d, u) \rightarrow \Diamond use(c, d, u))$ inherently not enforceable!

Limitation: $\Box(\forall c, d, u. collect(c, d, u) \rightarrow \diamond_{[0,b]} delete(c, d, u))$

 $\textbf{Lawfulness:} \quad \Box(\forall c, d, u. \, \textsf{use}(c, d, u) \rightarrow \blacklozenge(\textsf{consent}(u, c) \lor \textsf{legal_grounds}(u, d)))$

 $\textbf{Consent:} \qquad \Box(\forall c, d, u. \, \textsf{use}(c, d, u) \rightarrow (\blacklozenge \textsf{legal_grounds}(u, d)) \lor (\neg \textsf{revoke}(u, c) \, \mathcal{S} \, \textsf{consent}(u, c)))$

Information: $\Box(\forall c, d, u. collect(c, d, u) \rightarrow ((\bigcirc inform(u)) \lor (\phi inform(u))))$

Deletion: $\Box(\forall c, d, u. \text{ deletion_request}(c, d, u) \rightarrow \Diamond_{[0,30]} \text{ delete}(c, d, u))$

Sharing: $\Box(\forall c, d, u, p. deletion_request(c, d, u) \land (\blacklozenge share(p, d)) \rightarrow \Diamond_{[0,30]} \mathsf{notify}(p, d))$

Evaluation – RQ1 (Expressiveness)

- **X** Minimization: $\Box(\forall c, d, u. collect(c, d, u) \rightarrow \Diamond use(c, d, u))$
- ✓ Limitation: $\Box(\forall c, d, u. collect(c, d, u) \rightarrow \Diamond_{[0,b]} delete(c, d, u))$
- $\checkmark \quad \text{Lawfulness:} \quad \Box(\forall c, d, u. \, \mathsf{use}(c, d, u) \rightarrow \blacklozenge(\mathsf{consent}(u, c) \lor \mathsf{legal_grounds}(u, d)))$
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- **Information**: □(\forall c, d, u. collect(c, d, u) → ((\bigcirc inform(u))) ∨ (\blacklozenge inform(u))))
- **Deletion**: $\Box(\forall c, d, u. deletion_request(c, d, u) \rightarrow \Diamond_{[0,30]} delete(c, d, u))$
- ✓ Sharing: $\Box(\forall c, d, u, p. deletion_request(c, d, u) \land (♦ share(p, d)) → ♦_{[0,30]} notify(p, d))$ transparently enforceable, no policy rewriting needed!

Evaluation – RQ2+3 (Performance)

Real-time condition: $\max_{\ell}(a) \leq 1/a$.

Event rate (avg_{er}, s^{-1}) and maximum latency (max_{ℓ}, ms) for the largest real-time acceleration a.

	WHYENF Enforcer		WHYMON* Monitor		EnfPoly Enforcer	
Policy	avg_{er}	\max_{ℓ}	avg_{er}	max_ℓ	avg_{er}	max_ℓ
Limitation	632	14	not supported		not supported	
Lawfulness	405	15	405	12	6479	1.0
Consent	51	96	101	51	6479	1.0
Information	202	13	405	16	not supported	
Deletion	632	19	13	434	not supported	
Sharing	202	26	13	289	not supported	

Consistent findings on synthetic traces



WHYENF2

- + Language extensions: let bindings, complex terms, aggregations
- + Performance optimizations
- ▶ Using WHYENF as a backend for enforcing legal requirements in software
 - + Instrument of web applications
 - + Domain-specific language for legal specs

Thank you for your attention!

If you are interested in this work, feel free to drop us an e-mail:

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Proactive Real-Time First-Order Enforcement



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Abstract. Moders advance system must comply with incremising to one production in bound meaning from individual contourbies to dota per equations in a bound meaning from individual contourbies to dota systems to not only observe, but also activatly control, the behaviour of target systems in ymosphysic, their activation examples (compliance theory of the system) and the system of the system of the systems in the system of the system of the system of the systems of the system of the system of the system of the systems of the system of the system of the system of the systems of the system of the system of the system of the systems of the system of the system of the system of the one officient of physics from the study in read-target with individual correlation of the study of the system of the system of the system of the system of a system of the system of the

 ${\bf Keywords:} \ {\rm runtime\ enforcement} \cdot {\rm temporal\ logic} \cdot {\rm obligations}$

1 Introduction

As modern software systems become increasingly complex, they are required to comply with a myriad of growingly intricate regulations. The ability to monitor and control such systems is an important, technically challenging task.

Iteration enforcement (f) tackets this problem by discretising and controlling a super system under each study (80%), which its incomposition parallella, comply any strategies of the strategi